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Introduction
I consider the detailed investigation of understanding to be a worthwhile undertaking for a number of interrelated reasons. Firstly, although it is an epistemic standing which is obviously closely related to knowledge, understanding arguably demands a higher level of intellectual sophistication. This is possibly because, as we shall see, we have reason to believe that understanding is a more strongly internalist notion than knowledge. Secondly, there is currently only a small body of epistemological literature available on understanding, especially as directly compared to knowledge, and this makes the classification of different forms of understanding still controversial and unhelpfully imprecise in places. As a result, it is as yet not entirely clear which features of understanding make it importantly different from knowledge, or which sorts of understanding are particularly epistemically significant. 

Importantly, there is also reason to believe that investigating the connection and contrast between understanding and knowledge may end up shedding some light on the epistemic value problem. Although we shall later see at least two other important formulations of the value problem, the traditional and most straightforward version (sometimes called the primary value problem) challenges us to explain and provide evidence for the common claim that knowledge is distinctively valuable in the sense that it has more value than mere true belief. The predominant thought is that knowledge has value beyond its practical applications, and in general our treatment of it certainly suggests we think it has final value (i.e., value as an end in itself). However, this might be rooted in pre-theoretical bias—that is to say, we may only assume knowledge is finally valuable prior to considering the consequences and difficulties holding this view might generate. If a theory of knowledge cannot provide an explanation of how and why knowledge is as valuable as we assume it is, then many contemporary epistemologists are inclined to see this as grounds to strongly consider rejecting that theory, as Zagzebski (1999) and Williamson (2000) do. A more reasonable demand on theories of knowledge might instead be that they should be rejected if they cannot either (i) solve the value problem, or (ii) explain why knowledge is not valuable in spite of its appearance. 

It is with reference to this second option that understanding is relevant to the investigation of epistemic value. A revisionist theory of epistemic value is one which meets the demand of option (ii) above by diagnosing of the attraction of the intuition that knowledge is distinctively valuable, coupling it with the claim that this intuition is nonetheless false. Given that understanding and knowledge appear to have many characteristics in common, it may be possible to construct such a revionist theory based around the notion that we take knowledge to be valuable because we are implicitly and mistakenly ascribing to knowledge some crucial, value-conferring trait(s) of understanding. For that reason, it is worthwhile to investigate not just the nature and value of understanding itself, but also its comparative value.

Nevertheless, before a theory claiming that understanding has more value than knowledge can be properly constructed or assessed, a lot of groundwork must be done. Initially, it is important to investigate whether understanding is something that stands alone in epistemology, as it has been repeatedly argued that it is actually just a form of knowledge. If it can be successfully shown that they are two separate epistemic states, it will next be necessary to separate out different forms of understanding and ascertain which (if any) are plausible candidates for the central component of a revisionist theory of epistemic value, and also to explore why any essential features of the epistemically significant sort of understanding confer value upon it.

In my first chapter, I shall begin the analysis of understanding by considering the initially plausible claim that understanding is a species of knowledge. In order to do this, I shall investigate a variety of ways in which the two epistemic states might come apart, and see whether the notion that they often do so is plausible. In my second chapter, I shall progress to examine a number of the most common and plausible hallmark features of understanding discussed in the current literature, and in the third chapter go on to try and clarify the different sorts of understanding that are available to agents whilst trying to discover which of these is epistemically significant (and why). I shall then explore the value problem for knowledge in more depth in my fourth chapter, explaining that there are in fact three interrelated value problems and looking at what degree of success the most promising attempt to solve these problems has had. Following that, I shall look at the properties which I believe are primarily responsible for the value of understanding, and investigate whether its possessing such properties allow us to better explain why understanding might be finally valuable even if knowledge is not. To conclude, I shall summarise what import my discussion has for the practice of contemporary epistemological theorising in general, and briefly review possibly fruitful avenues for further research.


1. Is understanding a species of knowledge?
1.1 The traditional perspective in philosophy of science
In epistemology, the dominant view is that understanding is possessed of distinctive value but is not a species of knowledge (e.g., Kvanvig (2003), Zagzebski (2001), and Riggs (forthcoming)). In contrast, philosophers of science have traditionally taken understanding why X is the case to be equivalent to knowing why X is the case (which is in turn supposed to be equivalent to knowing that X is the case because of Y). The thought is that, for example, my understanding of why Lewis isn’t home is equivalent to knowing why Lewis isn’t home, which is in turn equivalent to my knowing that Lewis isn’t home because, say, he is out at a doctor’s appointment. Examples of this line of thought can be found in Lipton (2004) and Kitcher (2002), among others. It is worth noting that it may not be reasonable or fair to compare this highly specific conception of understanding to the much more broad epistemological conception. Nevertheless, even if it would not be appropriate to dismiss the philosophy of science claim on this basis, it is still worth investigating the idea that understanding might be a species of knowledge simply in order to see whether it is a plausible notion to adopt. 

In order to see whether the above conception of understanding holds up in spite of the resistance of most epistemologists, we ought to investigate whether there are cases in which knowledge and understanding clearly come apart. If there are not, then it is probably misguided to construct a revionist theory of epistemic value focused on understanding. If there are cases in which knowledge and understanding come apart in the relevant direction, however, then we can reasonably dismiss the thought that understanding is a species of knowledge and instead look towards finding a more plausible account (one which will perhaps support the notion that understanding may have distinctive value even if knowledge does not).

1.2	Knowledge without understanding
Given that it is never argued that knowledge entails understanding, it is simplest to begin our examination of how knowledge and understanding might come apart with a discussion of how we come to have knowledge without understanding. Even if many obvious cases of knowledge do involve concurrent understanding, I can see no compelling reason to suppose that knowledge cannot exist without understanding—in fact, knowledge possession without the associated understanding appears to be quite common. Bob can learn the fact ‘E=MC²’ and therefore know it, but not understand it or its significance in the slightest. Similarly, he might know gravity exists without understanding it. My friend Martin, a sound engineer, does not understand what an isolating transformer is—he describes himself as knowing that it is a box which you put 240v into and get 240 out of, and he knows that the ‘safe’ side has a floating earth, but he sheepishly admits that he still doesn’t understand why this is a good thing. This sort of knowledge without understanding is a common occurrence, especially given the amount of technology the purpose or outcome of which we are accustomed to simply accepting without having the faintest understanding of how or why this is so.

Kvanvig’s main example of knowing without understanding (p. 191) is slightly different—he cites the possibility of knowing a person without understanding her, which is clearly a widespread occurrence, but this may involve an unfair equivocation on the word ‘know’. It seems that his use of ‘know’ here is an epistemically irrelevant form which we use to describe the quality of interpersonal relationships rather than the acquisition of true beliefs in propositions. However, irrespective of whether Kvanvig’s example is a valid illustration of knowledge without understanding in the relevant sense, that one can doubt how well it shows that knowledge and understanding can come apart suggests it is not an ideal case to provide in support of the distinction. Instead, cases such as the one involving Martin make it straightforwardly clear that there are instances in which knowledge is present without the corresponding understanding.

Although this seems straightforward, when I later turn to discuss Pritchard’s work on cognitive achievement I shall also explore why cases which follow Jennifer Lackey’s model (2007) support the notion that knowledge can exist without understanding because of a highly specific trait required by understanding and not by knowledge. There, I shall look at arguments for the claim that knowledge and cognitive achievement can come apart. This thesis has important implications for robust virtue epistemology (so described by Pritchard because its analysis of knowledge is entirely focused on the notion of true belief produced by belief-forming processes that are epistemically virtuous). However, for our purposes we shall see it also has important implications for the difference between the key features of knowledge and understanding, as exposition of the content of Lackey cases lends credence to the plausible thought that cognitive achievement is a central component of understanding.

1.3 Understanding without knowledge
However, that one can have knowledge without understanding is of course the less important of the two possible ways in which these two epistemic states might come apart, as the standard claim in philosophy of science is that understanding implies knowledge (not that knowledge implies understanding). Kvanvig (p. 191) points out that for understanding to be a species of knowledge, the terms ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ need not be synonymous—all that is required is entailment in one direction. In other words, it need only be the case that your understanding of something implies knowledge of that thing, and this looks prima facie plausible. When one understands some chunk of information, it is most often the case that one also knows the information contained in said chunk. For example, if I understand John will only pass his course if he performs satisfactorily in his final exams, in order to have understanding here must I not also know that John’s passing his course depends on his exam performance?

Cases in which understanding obviously does imply associated knowledge are abundant, and in light of this it is initially difficult to produce cases which clearly show that understanding can exist without the related knowledge. In order to see how it is possible and to convincingly contest the thesis primarily advocated by philosophers of science, we need to explore a specific sort of epistemic luck which affects knowledge whilst leaving understanding untouched. That understanding is compatible with this environmental luck (a form of veritic epistemic luck termed so by Pritchard, forthcoming a) shows that knowing and understanding are distinct states. That it is perhaps uncommon to understand something without possessing the associated knowledge does nothing to detract from the fact that understanding simply cannot be a species of knowledge if the two epistemic standings are ever capable of coming apart in this fashion. I shall expand on how this comes to be the case in the section which explores whether luck-immunity is a hallmark trait of understanding.


1.4 Understanding and knowledge are significantly different
We have seen that one can have knowledge without having the associated understanding—the prevalence of cases such as the one involving Martin and the isolating transformer shows how easily one can know without understanding. Further, we shall see that one can understand something without possessing the associated knowledge. The existence and influence of environmental luck means that I can, for example, understand why my friend isn’t at home even if the fact I could easily have been wrong means I fail to know why he isn’t, thus confirming that knowledge and understanding are incontestably different. This establishes the falsity of the claim advanced by philosophers of science, i.e., that understanding why X is the case is equivalent to knowing why X is the case (which is in turn equivalent to knowing that X is the case because of Y). If understanding is not a species of knowledge, however, then what exactly is it, and what makes it different in this way? I shall now turn to look at some possible features of understanding which have been lauded by a variety of philosophers as the key features distinguishing it from knowledge.


2. How does understanding differ from knowledge?
2.1 Understanding’s alleged transparency
Zagzebski (e.g., 2001) conceives of understanding as differing from knowledge in three crucial ways. Firstly, she claims that it is transparent, meaning that there is no conceptual space between seeming to understand and actually understanding. Pritchard points out that this transparency claim downgrades understanding to a kind of minimal consistency and coherence in one’s beliefs. The problem here is that there is a very small class of things which are transparent to us, and this limits the epistemic basis of understanding severely if said basis must be transparent. For example, I cannot account for my understanding of why my friend crashed his car by citing my knowledge of how speeding can cause car crashes, because I can’t appeal to empirical knowledge in order to explain why I have propositional understanding here since (as something possessed of factivity) knowledge is not transparent.

Given that the transparency of an epistemic state relies on its further being non-factive, the failure of this transparency condition on understanding is plainly highlighted by the falsity of Zagzebski’s second claim: that understanding is non-factive.

2.2 Factivity
Zagzebski’s second key assertion, that understanding is possessed of non-factivity whilst knowledge is not, means she holds that one’s understanding is not undermined if the beliefs which underlie that understanding are false. This is a decidedly odd claim to make. To see this, return to the prior example in which my friend Lewis is not home when I go to visit him and I believe this is because he is at a doctor’s appointment. Allow that I have a coherent and consistent set of beliefs about, say, Lewis and the doctor. However, further imagine that these beliefs are in fact false—Lewis did not have an appointment today, and so it failed to play a role in his not being home. In such a case, I would agree with Pritchard and assume we would not hold that I understand why Lewis isn’t home (although we would naturally say that I thought I understood, and perhaps even allow that I was warranted in thinking that I understood). If this refusal to attribute understanding in such cases is correct, then understanding must be factive, further entailing that understanding is not transparent since factivity requires a distinction between one’s thinking that X obtains and X’s actually obtaining (i.e., conceptual space between seeming to understand and actually understanding). The form of understanding which is concerned with a subject matter (e.g., quantum physics, or my cousin Kristoffer) might be attainable even if one holds a few false beliefs about that subject matter, but (i) we shall see that this objectual understanding (sometimes termed ‘holistic understanding’)  is not usually the sort at issue in comparing understanding to knowledge, and (ii) even objectual/holistic understanding is surely not attainable in situations where one has no true beliefs about the relevant subject matter at all, and that seems to be what Zagzebski’s non-factivity condition on understanding entails when it comes to understanding a subject matter.

Kvanvig (2003) does not make the dubious transparency claim, and he does recognise that understanding is factive. As such, he is already side-stepping the main problems that beset Zagzebski’s account when she places too strong an emphasis on understanding’s internalist character. On Kvanvig’s view, the epistemic state of understanding involves “…whether the person has seen the right kinds of relationships among the various items of information grasped” so it is clear that the emphasis on its internalist nature is still there; however, he recognises understanding has a more substantial connection with external states of affairs than Zagzebski’s account supposes. 

As regards understanding’s factivity specifically, Kvanvig’s thought is that what appear to be non-factive expressions of understanding are misleading because they involve either (i) misspeaking, or (ii) employing the terms in a way which differs from their theoretically important usage (p. 190). He believes the same to be true of non-factive expressions of knowledge. Although what he calls objectual understanding of a subject matter (as represented by such sentences as ‘I understand X’ as opposed to ‘I understand that X’) can’t strictly be said to be factive given that only propositions can be true or false, Kvanvig contends that “[factivity] is in the background” (p. 191) when it comes to this sort of understanding. What he means by this claim is just that the examples he is concerned with are ones in which the objectual understanding involves holding certain beliefs about the object which have to be true for the objectual understanding to be epistemically significant for his project. A set of factive propositions are implicit in the attribution of objectual understanding. For example, one of the things involved in an agent’s understanding of music theory is that agent’s having true beliefs about it. I shall later explore objectual understanding in somewhat more depth; for now, the important point to take from this initial mention of it is just that understanding involves factivity regardless of its type. This makes it a crucial feature of understanding (though not one which sets it apart from knowledge, as it too is factive).

2.3 Luck-immunity
The third way in which Zagzebski thinks understanding differs from knowledge is in its immunity to knowledge-undermining luck. The common thought is that malignant epistemic luck acts as a barrier to knowledge whilst leaving understanding completely untouched. However, Pritchard argues that understanding is not immune to all luck—it is his contention that it is only immune to environmental luck. He starts by looking at the robust epistemologist’s claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement, and then shows that this is not in fact the case because knowledge is undermined by environmental epistemic luck while achievement is not. If understanding is a cognitive achievement, which is plausibly is, then it too will be unaffected by environmental luck. So how does this argument for the luck-immunity of cognitive achievement run?
Pritchard (forthcoming a) provides a helpful example of general environmental luck as a useful lead-in to his discussion of specifically epistemic environmental luck. He imagines a scenario in which an archer selects a target, successfully fires at it, and hits it as a result of her skill. The twist is that she would have missed if she had picked another target, because all the other targets are surrounded by arrow-deflecting forcefields. Although her achievement is not undermined (as achievement is generally thought to require only that her skill be creditable for her success), the success is nonetheless lucky in the sense that she could easily have missed. If this success should be called an achievement, luck-infused though it is, then so too ought cognitive successes (such as understanding) which occur in a manner similarly related to environmental luck.
A case involving specifically environmental luck undermining knowledge is the barn façade case (e.g., Goldman, 1976), in which we have an agent using her reliable cognitive abilities to form a true belief that she sees a barn. The belief is epistemically lucky in that she doesn’t know that nearly all nearby barn-shaped things are actually papier-mâché façades, and so her belief could very easily have been false. Though this prevents her from having knowledge, her success is surely still a cognitive achievement, illustrating that in some cases there is something to knowledge above and beyond mere cognitive achievement. Here, the true belief is caused by (in the sense of being primarily credible to) the agent’s cognitive abilities, so this is a cognitive achievement, but it is not a case of knowledge because her belief is only luckily true. I shall return once again to the important connection between luck and cognitive achievement when I turn to examine whether cognitive achievement is an integral component of understanding, but for the moment all we require to keep in mind is that we have seen cases of environmental luck show that cognitive achievement is not an integral component of knowledge.

Kvanvig, however, does not have a nuanced conception of different breeds of epistemic luck in mind, and simply contends that understanding is immune to knowledge-undermining epistemic luck without exceptions. On his view, this is because knowledge requires that there be non-accidental links between (internal) mental states and external events in just the right way, whilst the chief requirement of understanding is that there be the right coherence-making relations in some agent’s collection of information. This essentially means the agent must have a firm grasp of how all this related information fits together. He has a particular example intended to show that understanding is not undermined by epistemic luck (and the sort of epistemic luck he has in mind appears to be the Veritic luck present in Gettier cases which intervenes between facts and the formation of true beliefs). In his case, S reads a book on the Comanche tribe, and thereby acquires a belief set about the Comanche and (Kvanvig claims) a ‘historical understanding of the Comanche dominance of the Southern plains of North America from the late 17th until the late 19th century’ (p. 197). Kvanvig stipulates that there are no falsehoods in the relevant class of beliefs, and also that S can correctly answer all relevant questions whilst confidently believing that he is expressing the truth. He claims that we would generally expect S to have knowledge of his relevant beliefs, but that this isn’t essential for his understanding and as a result it wouldn’t matter if these true beliefs had been Gettierised (due to being merely accidentally true). 

In response to obvious ambiguities in this case, Pritchard suggests that we first consider two versions of an analogous case which I shall try to parallel here. Return to the case of my friend Lewis, upon whose doorstep I am discovering has left his flat. Suppose that this is in fact a Gettier case where there’s an intervention between my true belief and a fact about how things actually are. Specifically, suppose that I see someone who looks like Lewis’s neighbour, that I ask him where Lewis is, and that I am told Lewis is at a doctor’s appointment. This, as it happens, coheres with my wider set of beliefs, but in a bizarre twist it is actually the neighbour’s identical twin to whom I am speaking (and this is his first visit from out of town, meaning that he has never met Lewis and has no idea where he actually is). Lewis is at a doctor’s appointment, but the luck involved in this case prevents me from knowing the proposition ‘Lewis is not home because he has a doctor’s appointment.’ However, does this luck also prevent me from understanding? It would seem that yes, I do fail to understand why Lewis is out in this case—you surely cannot come to understand why your friend is out by asking someone who (entirely unbeknownst to you) is not his neighbour and has in fact  never even met him.

However, as we have seen, understanding is preserved in some scenarios which feature certain other breeds of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. In the barn façade case, remember, what we have is a non-intervening form of veritic luck called environmental luck. Imagine now that the person I ask in the Lewis case is Lewis’s neighbour, but could easily not have been since he has only exited his flat for a brief moment, while his compulsive liar of a twin was there seconds before and will return in less than a minute. Stipulate this time that the twin would have given a false answer, had I encountered him instead. In this case, does the luck involved present me from understanding? It would seem although the epistemic luck prevents my true belief from counting as knowledge, I nonetheless do have understanding in this version of the scenario. It also seems that this is a case of cognitive success caused by a cognitive ability (and thereby also a case of cognitive achievement). That this case involves cognitive achievement and no knowledge once again shows the falsity of robust virtue epistemology, but for our current purposes what is more important is that cases which fit this model are still cases of understanding in spite of the presence of environmental luck.  This means that Kvanvig would be right to assert that specifically environmental epistemic luck is compatible with the possession of understanding. Here, I have all the true beliefs required to understand why Lewis isn’t home, and I went about acquiring them in the right way to develop understanding—there appears to be no compelling reason to suppose that environmental luck undermines understanding, as (unlike cases where possible knowledge hangs in the balance) it doesn’t matter that the situation was very nearly not what it was in actuality.

The upshot of this is that when Kvanvig supplies his supposed paradigm case of understanding possession in a case without knowledge, whether the case goes through depends on what brand of epistemic luck his book-reader is subjected to. This isn’t something Kvanvig makes explicit when he says that understanding would be left intact even if the agent’s beliefs were Gettierised. Pritchard re-describes the case in two ways, one in which understanding is undermined and one in which it is left untouched while knowledge is obstructed in both cases. In the first, we are to imagine that the agent gets her beliefs from a faux-academic book filled with mere rumours which turn out to be luckily true. In this Gettier-style case, she has good reason to believe her true beliefs, but the source of them is highly unreliable and this makes her beliefs only luckily true. This means that she fails to gain the historical understanding of the Comanche that she was aiming for, just as I fail to gain understanding of why Lewis isn’t home by gaining a true belief about his absence from someone who is only pretending to be his neighbour. In Pritchard’s second re-description of the Comanche case, we are to imagine that the agent is reading a reliable academic book which is the source of her many true beliefs about the Comanche. Luck intervenes because this is the only trustworthy book on the Comanche—every other one on the shelves she browsed was filled with rumour and ungrounded supposition. She still gains the desired historical understanding of the Comanche, because she came across the facts in the relevantly correct way, just as I did in the case where I encountered Lewis’s neighbour but could easily have encountered the neighbour’s dishonest and ill-informed identical twin.

Failing to distinguish between different sorts of epistemic luck is the source of confusion in Kvanvig’s comments about the Comanche case, then. He is wrong to think that understanding is unaffected by the intervening, Gettier-style form of veritic luck, so it would be a mistake to assert that a hallmark feature of understanding is its ability to thwart all forms of epistemic luck. This means it is not luck-immunity per se which is a hallmark feature of understanding, but rather immunity to environmental luck instead.

2.4 Degrees of understanding
Like Zagzebski, Kvanvig has three particular features in mind which he holds are the most important elements distinguishing understanding from knowledge. The first of Kvanvig’s central claims is that understanding admits of degrees. The thought is that you can understand something to a greater or lesser extent, whilst knowledge is a binary concept—you either know that p, or you do not. He contends that one have a better understanding of something than someone else, and also a greater understanding than someone else (which is slightly different). Sandra’s having a greater degree of understanding than Irene is due to Sandra’s having a more sophisticated comprehension of the coherence-making relations. On the other hand, when Bob has a better understanding of something than William does, this is due to Bob’s possessing a larger and more coherent body of information. 

A superficial objection to the claim that there are degrees of understanding and not of knowledge might be that people often talk about ‘in-depth knowledge.’ However, when people talk about in-depth knowledge, perhaps they are tacitly referring to understanding, albeit by using misleading and incorrect terminology. I have deeper misgivings about Kvanvig’s degrees condition on understanding, largely in light of criticisms from Brogaard (2007) and based on her claim that it is possible to distinguish objectual knowledge from propositional knowledge in the same way that Kvanvig does with objectual and propositional understanding. She raises the issue of whether Kvanvig only achieves the result he desires (i.e., establishes the axiological superiority of understanding) because he compares understanding to a construal of knowledge which is not rich enough. Brogaard makes a convincing case for this notion by showing how objectual knowledge makes the same demands as objectual understanding (a thought I shall revisit in my discussion of whether Kvanvig does manage to show that understanding has more value than knowledge). As a result, I would be cautious to award this particular characteristic of understanding the status of being a feature that is uniquely necessary to understanding, and (as argued by Pritchard, forthcoming b) it would not serve to sufficiently distinguish knowledge from understanding—even if Kvanvig is right that only understanding admits of degrees, this does not show that there are some cases of understanding which are not concurrent, corresponding cases of knowledge (or indeed vice versa).

2.5 The agent’s grasping explanatory relationships
Kvanvig maintains that understanding’s most important characteristic is that it needs the agent to grasp ‘explanatory and other coherence-making relationships in a large body of information’ (p. 192). One can only achieve understanding when pieces of information are correctly assembled together by the agent into a coherent overall picture (essentially in the manner of a jigsaw puzzle). Whilst an agent can know many unconnected propositions, he can only have understanding when these are connected together in such a way as to produce ‘[a] comprehensive body of information’ and (crucially) when the agent comprehends the aforementioned explanatory relationships between the individual pieces of information. Kvanvig, then, is a coherentist about understanding, citing that coherentism is more appropriately applied to understanding than to justification because belief systems do not come compartmentalised whilst ‘standard ascriptions of understanding’ do (p. 195). Coherentists about justification respond to the regress problem¹ by saying that what justifies a belief is not another belief but rather the way in which the first coheres with an overall picture of which it is merely one small component. Employing coherentism in a theory of understanding is supposed to be a straightforward matter because understanding already comes compartmentalised when we ascribe it—the bodies of information that are the focus of understanding are clearly delineated from one another, for example in the case of a vet’s understanding of cat physiology, and his separate understanding of dog physiology. This means that there is not an obvious need to create awkward, artificial boundaries as there is in coherentist theories of justification².

The grasp of explanatory relationships is a largely internalist notion, and so directly related to it is understanding’s internalist character. 

2.6 Understanding’s internalist character
The thesis of epistemic internalism advocates a strong emphasis on whether the facts in virtue of which an agent is justified are reflectively accessible to her. Epistemic externalism, on the other hand, posits that things obtaining outside of the agent can powerfully influence the justification of her beliefs. An example in which the disagreement between these two camps is particularly obvious is the infamous chicken sexer case (e.g., Lewis, 1996). In this example, suppose Anne is possessed of a highly reliable ability to distinguish between male baby chicks and female baby chicks. She has no idea how she is correctly identifying their gender, as there is nothing superficially obvious that differs between the male and female chicks. When Anne picks up a baby chick and correctly identifies it as male, epistemic externalists about justification will say that she does have knowledge that the chick is male, because what matters is that her belief matches the truth. She is exhibiting a highly reliable ability, and has a true belief about the chick’s gender, and so they will contend that it is irrelevant that she cannot explain how this ability works and is not aware of why she is right in such cases. Epistemic internalists about justification, however, will say that she does not have knowledge that the chick is male because, although her belief matches the truth, she is unaware of any sort of justification for this belief. Their thought is that although she is exhibiting a reliable ability, it is important that reflecting on the process of chicken-sexing will shed no light on how this ability works, and that she cannot offer any grounds supporting why she thinks this baby chick is male.

Epistemic internalism coheres well with understanding, as it doesn’t look as though there is any scope for understanding to be sensibly construed in a purely externalistic fashion (unlike knowledge, or the justification condition on knowledge). Understanding is a heavily internalist notion because one cannot grasp explanatory relationships and be unaware of it—it is an epistemic state which simply cannot obtain without the agent having solid, reflectively accessible support for the particular belief(s) underlying the understanding’s composition. After all, as we shall see, the reason Lackey-style cases help illustrate the possibility of knowledge without understanding is exactly because they revolve around agents who don’t have reflectively accessible justification for their beliefs. 

Kvanvig holds that understanding works something like internalistic justification—although epistemic luck prevents the combination of that justification and true belief sufficing for knowledge in cases of epistemic luck, the actual justification itself is supposedly not undermined by that luck (just as understanding, Kvanvig claims, is not). However, although close to being correct, we have noted that this claim is too strong. Understanding is not untouched by all forms of epistemic luck, though it is immune to environmental luck. In light of this, understanding cannot be an entirely internalist concept, and it is (as we have seen) possessed of factivity. It appears to have the same external constraints that are involved in all forms of cognitive achievement (i.e., the success involved must be relevant, and the right link must obtain between the agent’s ability and their success). This means that we should be wary of fully endorsing Kvanvig’s comparison between internalistic justification and understanding—the former holds fast regardless of whether one’s belief is false, whilst the latter does not. While Kvanvig is correct to describe understanding as primarily internalist, his recognition of understanding’s factivity should have prevented him from describing understanding as working in the manner that internalistic justification does.

2.7 Cognitive achievement
As indicated in the above section on epistemic luck, Pritchard argues that we have good cause to believe that understanding involves a very specific sort of achievement—cognitive achievement, which he denies is essentially wedded to knowledge (contrary to what robust virtue epistemologists would hold). Virtue epistemology’s focus on cognitive achievement satisfies our sense that instances of knowledge are strongly connected to an agent’s reliable abilities, thus ruling out cases in which a belief is justified by some conceptions if the agent in that case gains a true belief which has no connection with her cognitive abilities. In order to make sure that their account of knowledge rules out cases which feature Gettier-style intervening luck, virtue epistemologists demand that the true belief has to be caused be the agent’s operating her cognitive abilities, rather than just asking that the true belief be a product of her cognitive virtue. Specifically, they demand ‘a success that is because of ability.’ (e.g., Greco, 2002). The most sensible interpretation of this casual relationship is to say that the true belief must be primarily creditable to the agent’s cognitive abilities (Pritchard forthcoming b, p. 24). 

On this picture of cognitive achievement, then, when a cognitive ability leads to a cognitive success it is thereby a cognitive achievement, and the thought relevant to our concerns here is that when an agent comes to have understanding it is simply unavoidable that this is a cognitive success resulting from a cognitive ability. One of the things Pritchard’s discussion of cognitive achievement serves to do is to help show that knowledge and understanding are incontestably different in a very substantial way, because cognitive achievement is always present in cases of understanding, and yet only sometimes attached to knowledge. In my subsequent treatment of cognitive achievement, where I provide examples which I argue lack the presence of cognitive achievement this will generally be because any success involved is not caused by the agent’s cognitive abilities (in the sense of being primarily creditable to his or her abilities).

I shall now look in detail at supporting evidence for the thesis that knowledge does not always involve cognitive achievement, and explore how the same cases in play here can also be used to make an important point about understanding. Pritchard uses Lackey-style cases to show that there are instances of knowledge which don’t involve cognitive achievement. The standard Lackey case (2007) features an agent asking for directions from the first person she meets in an unfamiliar town. The resident of the town is in possession of first-hand knowledge which he then communicates to the agent who proceeds on down the street in the correct direction. We naturally want to say that the questioning agent has gained knowledge via the native agent’s testimony, but there is a problem for robust virtue epistemology’s claims that knowledge is a cognitive achievement directly caused by one’s cognitive ability. The problem is that it doesn’t look like her cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability here. Rather, what seems to be playing the important role is the cognitive ability of the native agent who provided her with the testimonial (though a charitable interpretation might claim that the success is at least due to a combination of their cognitive abilities). Either way, this example shows that there are cases in which knowledge requires a lot less of the knower than cognitive achievement, rendering the virtue theorist’s achievement-based epistemology dubious.

Lackey takes her standard to show that you can have knowledge without being in the possession of any credit whatsoever for your true belief, but whether she succeeds is contentious. Pritchard (forthcoming b, e.g., p.36-7) picks up on the fact that a true belief’s being of credit to an agent is not the same thing as a true belief’s being primarily creditable to that agent. More specifically, the former means that is appropriate to praise the agent for holding the true belief, whilst the latter means that her acts of agency are in the main responsible for the fact that she holds that true belief. Pritchard identifies the first as the one Lackey intends to feature in her standard case, and the second as that involved in the robust virtue epistemology claim. He thinks that in the Lackey case, what happens is that the questioning agent’s true belief is not primarily creditable to her—she does have a true belief deserving of credit, just not one which is primarily creditable to her agency (illustrating that these notions are not co-dependent). 

There isn’t room to deny that the questioning agent in the standard Lackey case exhibits at least some degree of cognitive achievement, given that we must suppose she chose sensibly when she decided who to approach—a small child, a member of a party of tourists or a passing pigeon would have been poor choices, for example. Further to this, Pritchard points out that she is most likely sensitive to the possibility of the presence of defeaters, such as obviously false directions. Without her exhibition of the ability to discern an appropriate agent from an inappropriate one and the ability to pick up defeaters, it would be suspect to grant her any knowledge at all (and certainly wrong to grant her any sort of internalist knowledge). To claim that knowledge can be present without associated cognitive achievement, however, all we need is for it to be the case that an agent’s cognitive success is not always reached because of only that agent’s cognitive abilities. We can assert this while still conceding that her cognitive success is of credit to her to a certain extent. 

Now that we have seen how Lackey cases can show that knowledge does not always involve cognitive achievement and that cognitive success is not always primarily creditable to the epistemic agent, we can return to our central topic and see that Lackey-style cases also have an important part to play within the framework of understanding. Their role here is in illustrating the possibility of knowledge without understanding, which plausibly happens precisely when there is a lack of cognitive achievement on the part of the epistemic agent. Pritchard’s example is of understanding and knowing why his house burned down, and knowing that it happened to burn down because of faulty wiring. In his case, he tells his young son why the house burnt down and his son is not capable of comprehending how a fire might be started because of a house’s faulty wiring—it is obvious that he therefore doesn’t understand why the house has burnt down, and equally obvious that there is no cognitive achievement on his part (as his true belief is not primarily creditable to his own cognitive abilities). However, it would be odd to say he doesn’t know that the faulty wiring was the cause of the house fire. If so, he does know why his house burned down, and could communicate that information to a third party who would in response attribute knowledge to the son. 

To recap, it would seem that knowledge and cognitive achievement come apart in (i) cases that involve environmental luck (where one has cognitive achievement without knowledge), and also in (ii) Lackey-style cases (where one has knowledge without cognitive achievement). However, this is not the case with cognitive achievement and understanding—it seems that understanding always involves cognitive achievement, so where there is a lack of cognitive achievement then there cannot concurrently exist any genuine understanding. For example, Martin’s knowledge of what an isolating transformer is arguably does not involve a cognitive achievement, and nor does it involve understanding. On the other hand, David’s grasp of the techniques required to create complex three-dimensional images in a graphic design program is a clear case of understanding, and also of cognitive achievement. The barn façade case shows us that exhibiting a cognitive achievement doesn’t guarantee one knowledge because of the way in which knowledge-undermining environmental luck can intervene. However, cognitive achievement and understanding are mutually compatible with environmental luck, and Pritchard further observes that all cases where S has knowledge but doesn’t exhibit cognitive achievement are also cases in which S lacks understanding. We have, then, good grounds to suppose that all understanding involves cognitive achievement, making cognitive achievement a distinctive feature of understanding as compared to knowledge.

2.8 Exclusion of singular propositions
Kvanvig further writes that there is ‘no single proposition of which we ascribe understanding’ (except in trivial, theoretically uninteresting cases), while this is not true of knowledge (p. 195). Here, I take Kvanvig to be referring to the sort of understanding that Pritchard (forthcoming a) flags as simply equivalent to a statement of knowledge (e.g., as in the sentence ‘I understand that we have no milk left.’) After I conclude this section with a summary of understanding’s distinctive traits, I shall turn to precisely this issue—the issue of how different types of understanding work, and of which types are possessed of distinctive epistemic significance. 

2.9 The hallmark features of understanding
In light of the above, I would take the crucial and/or distinctive features of understanding to be as follows:
(i) It is factive (crucial, though not distinctive).
(ii) It is always a cognitive achievement (crucial and distinctive).
(iii) It is immune to knowledge-undermining environmental luck (crucial and distinctive).

Brogaard’s work (2007), which will be explored further in my discussion of her attack on Kvanvig’s value thesis, gives us cause to at least doubt the claim that understanding admits of degrees whilst knowledge does not, and to doubt the claim that only understanding involves a grasp of explanatory relationships. As a result, I have not included them in the above list. I shall now turn to look at the differences between several types of understanding, in the hopes of discerning which of these ought to be placed at the centre of a revisionist theory of epistemic value. 


3. Types of Understanding
3.1 ‘I understand X.’ (objectual or holistic understanding)
One form of understanding is represented by statements such as ‘I understand Ben’ and ‘I understand music theory.’ This sort of understanding is one of the types Kvanvig awards primary focus to, and he dubs it ‘objectual understanding.’ He describes it as obtaining ‘when understanding grammatically is followed by an object/subject matter, as in understanding the presidency, or the president, or politics.’ This objectual understanding is seemingly equivalent to what Pritchard terms holistic understanding—the only difference appears to be in the name, not in the way in which this form of understanding is construed. This particular sort of understanding is not the most straightforward to use for our purposes (i.e., the direct comparison of the characteristics and value of knowledge with the characteristics and value of understanding), and shall henceforth be set aside in the interests of simplicity, but it is worth mentioning in passing given that both Kvanvig and Brogaard afford it considerable attention in their discussions of the value of understanding.

3.2 ‘I understand that X.’
The remainder of Kvanvig’s discussion of understanding focuses on a second main type (p. 191) that is supposedly the sort featuring in sentences which take the structure present in ‘I understand that X’. He calls this propositional understanding, and he describes it as obtaining ‘when we attribute understanding in the form of a propositional operator, as in understanding that something is the case.’ 

Pritchard points out that understanding isn’t normally directly concerned with a proposition, whereas knowledge is. It is not often that we say ‘I understand that X,’ and when we do it looks as though this sort of understanding of a proposition is just synonymous with knowing—the sentence ‘it is time for dinner’, for example, expresses the same notion regardless of whether preceded by ‘I understand that’ or ‘I know that.’ This usage that Pritchard sees as synonymous with expressions of propositional knowledge look as though it might be the same as what we have seen Kvanvig calls propositional understanding (which Brogaard calls ‘understanding-that’). However, Pritchard’s atomistic usage of understanding (i.e., ‘I understand why…’) is in fact taken by Kvanvig to be a form of understanding which can be reduced to propositional understanding (understanding-that) in all cases (p. 189). Kvanvig claims that the difference between knowledge and this sort of understanding lies in the fact that knowledge-that doesn’t demand that the agent grasp or appreciate ‘how the various elements in a body of information are related to each other in terms of explanatory, logical, probabilistic, and other kinds of relations’ (p. 192-3) whilst understanding-that definitely does require the grasping of such relations. There seems, therefore, to be some disagreement as to the degree of epistemic importance which ought to be allocated to understanding-that.

Upon closer inspection, I would argue that this is probably due to there being two sorts of understanding-that: (i) the uninteresting, knowledge-synonymous form that most likely appears in the bulk of cases (e.g., ‘I understand that the train leaves at seven o’clock’) and (ii) the sort that really does imply Kvanvig’s coherence-making relationships. This interesting sort of understanding-that is the one not synonymous with knowing-that, although it is worth noting that Kvanvig does not deny there are cases in which one has knowledge of a proposition as well as the related understanding.

Brogaard objects that you can assert your understanding that your flight was cancelled ‘without appreciating any explanatory or coherence-inducing relations in a larger body of information’ (p. 6). However, she seems to be missing the point of Kvanvig’s discussion, as such a use of ‘understand’ also seems to me to be synonymous with ‘know.’ As a result, I would hold that this is an instance of misspeaking on the part of the utterer, who really ought to have said ‘I know that my flight was cancelled’ in order to express the intended thought. This inaccurate use of ‘understand’ is the sort featured in (i) above, i.e., the sort not worthy of axiological investigation for the simple reason that its value will assumedly be equal to that of the form of knowledge it is synonymous with. These uninteresting cases involve an employment of the word that is theoretically illegitimate (and is therefore of no difference in value to a statement of knowledge). 

However, Brogaard’s main argument against Kvanvig centres on her conviction that knowledge also requires S to have a strong grasp of the coherence-making relationships present in (ii) above, and she claims that this means understanding is no more valuable than knowledge, no matter which fine-grained form of understanding we are dealing with. I will now turn to a third form of understanding and look at her argument for this claim.

3.3 ‘I understand why/what/where/when X.’
For Pritchard, the interesting and relevant sort of understanding appears in atomistic usages of understanding (i.e., in sentences that take the form ‘I understand why X is the case’). For Brogaard, this sort of understanding seems to fall under the heading of understanding-wh, and would therefore be taken by Kvanvig to always be explicable in terms of understanding-that (of the theoretically interesting breed that is not simply synonymous with knowing).

However, Brogaard appeals to an argument put forth by Schaffer (typescript) against the reductionist account of knowledge-wh, which she thinks can be employed against Kvanvig’s own reductionism about understanding-wh in order to show that neither reduction works, and that both epistemic states require coherence in one’s beliefs (thus rendering understanding no more valuable). Reductionists about knowledge-wh claim that we can always elucidate this sort of knowledge with reference to knowledge-that, because to know-wh is just to know the true answer to the question featured in the wh-clause (Brogaard, p.7). The thought is that to know why the cupboard is empty, for example, is just to know that p (where p is the true answer to the question ‘why is the cupboard empty?’). If reductionism about knowledge-wh fails, which Brogaard contends it does, then (i) reductionism about understanding-wh is in similar jeopardy, and (ii) the claim that understanding-wh has superior value because of an agent’s grasp of coherence-making relationships no longer looks plausible. What, then, is the problem with reductionism of this sort, and how does it show that knowledge-wh also requires coherence in ones beliefs?

Most obviously, it has counterintuitive results as regards the equivalency of questions. If Craig is washing the dishes, then the same answer is true of both the question ‘Is Craig or John [his identical twin] washing the dishes?’ and the question ‘Is Craig or Ben [his friend] washing the dishes?’ (i.e., ‘Craig is washing the dishes’ is the true answer to both questions). However, by the reductionist’s lights, this means that ‘I know whether Craig or John is washing the dishes’ is equivalent to ‘I know whether Craig or Ben is washing the dishes.’ The problem with this is that it is easy to answer a question about Craig and Ben because they are friends who look nothing alike, whilst it is significantly more difficult to answer a question concerning Craig and John as they are superficially identical. This makes it entirely possible to know whether Craig or Ben is doing the dishes whilst not knowing whether Craig or John is doing the dishes, and it is an unacceptable consequence of knowledge-reductionism that these two statements end up being labelled as equivalent.

In addition, Schaffer holds that this sort of reductionism is untenable because it is insufficient for one to merely know the appropriate answer to the question; one must also know that answer as the answer. To see what is meant here, imagine the following case (which is analogous to Brogaard’s party example, p.8). I know my old school friend Jennifer has moved to Aberdeen to attend university, but I have no idea that her partner has moved there with her. As it happens, moving to Aberdeen has allowed her partner to accept an excellent job that he would otherwise have had no chance of being able to take on, and as a result he is happier than he has ever been before. If all it takes to know why Jennifer’s partner is at his happiest is to know that Jennifer has moved to Aberdeen, then I surely know why Jennifer’s partner is happy. However, this looks like a ridiculous claim to make, because if I were to be asked why Jennifer’s partner is happy then I would not even be able to offer a reasonable guess, let alone answer correctly. Given these counterintuitive results, the reductive account of knowledge-wh is unsatisfactory.

In its place, Schaffer proposes a more nuanced account of how and when knowledge-wh obtains, and Brogaard thinks that this account can (i) show exactly why the agents in the above cases fail to have knowledge-wh, and (ii) reveal that why a reductive account of understanding-wh will also fail to work for much the same reason. On Schaffer’s picture, I know-wh if I know not only p, but also the correct answer to the wh-question as the answer to that question. This means I know whether Craig or his friend Ben is washing the dishes if and only if I know ‘Craig is washing the dishes’ as the correct answer to the question ‘Who is washing the dishes, Craig or Ben?’ As Brogaard puts it (p.8) knowing that p, as the true answer to Q, seems to require knowing that p is the true answer to Q. This is why I fail to know the answer to the question of why Jennifer’s partner is happy; I know Jennifer has moved to Aberdeen and so I do know the reason why he is happy, but I don’t know it as the reason. 

If we carry these concerns and discoveries over to Kvanvig’s reductive account of understanding-wh, Brogaard says we shall find it fails in the same way and that this failure to reduce both knowledge-wh and understanding-wh to their ‘that’ incarnations is due to the fact that the obtaining of a grasp of coherence-making relationships is of prime importance for both understanding and knowledge. To recap, Kvanvig thinks that occurrences of understanding-wh are always explicable in terms of understanding-that, but we run into the problems with reductionism straight away—even though I understand Jennifer’s moving to Aberdeen, I can’t understand why Jennifer’s partner is happy unless I understand the correct explanatory link between these two states of affairs.

Without a grasp of the explanatory relations between the separate claims that the agent knows and which are relevant to the question, an agent can’t have knowledge-wh or understanding-wh of p. Brogaard, then, wants to say that this shows understanding-wh to be of no greater value than knowing-wh, as both require an understanding of these explanatory relationships. 

She thinks Kvanvig might want to respond to this by restating that understanding a large body of information is a matter of degrees, whilst knowing is not. If S is a set of true individual propositions that one must believe in order to have a very good understanding of why the house burned down, then (for example) if one needs to understand that a short circuit was the cause of the fire in order to have a good understanding of why the house burned down, then the proposition ‘the short circuit was a cause of the fire’ is a member of S. The thought is that a low-standards epistemology would allow one to know why the house burned down while only knowing some of the members of set S. The result of this is that a very good understanding of why the house burned down would require believing a larger number of relevant truths and having a grasp of more explanatory and coherence-making relationships than would be required to know why the house burned down.

However, Brogaard has two responses to this. First, she claims it is not at all clear that we should concede that the above is correct, but even assuming it is we only need accept that it’s the case on a low standards account of knowledge. A high standards epistemology would not yield the result that understanding is more valuable than knowledge, because it might well require an agent to know all the propositions in set S rather than just some. Secondly, she argues that knowledge-that is obviously an all-or-nothing matter (we don’t say such things as ‘he knows that his food is in the oven better than you do’). However, maybe knowledge-wh is not the all-or-nothing matter it is generally purported to be. It makes, Brogaard claims, sense to claim that John’s knowledge of why the house burned down is better than Mary’s (although I’m not entirely convinced that this isn’t a linguistic error due to a marked difference between the pragmatic and theoretical rules for the ascription of understanding). A degree account of knowledge-wh would say that comprehensive understanding is more valuable than poor knowledge, but that the value of comprehensive understanding, Brogaard claims, is no greater than that of comprehensive knowledge.

Brogaard takes herself to have shown that understanding-that and understanding-why are not any more valuable than knowing-that and knowing-why (unless a low-standards epistemology is adopted), and she holds that the argument for this can be easily extended to further apply to understanding where, when, and what. In response to this attack on Kvanvig’s argument for the axiological superiority of understanding, there are three main lines we might take. We could (i) accept that Brogaard’s argument goes through and search for another way to make a case for understanding having value that is distinct from (and possibly greater than) that of knowledge, (ii) argue against her by trying to show that explanatory relationships are a necessary condition of understanding-wh but not a necessary condition of knowledge-wh, or (iii) argue against her by attempting to illustrate that uses of knowledge-wh just are cases of understanding, albeit cases in which understanding is expressed incorrectly. The problem with option (ii) is that it is difficult to generate successful illustrative examples, while the problem with option (iii) is just that it is not clear there are any compelling reasons to do so that are not just ad hoc. Why not, for example, instead argue for the opposite direction of fit—why not say that expressions of understanding are actually cases of knowledge-wh? 

The first option, then, looks to be the most promising. After all, even if Brogaard’s argument shows that requiring the agent to grasp coherence making relationships is a characteristic of both knowledge and understanding, this simply demonstrates that the explanatory relationships element of understanding cannot be the cause of its distinctive value. There are other reasons to think that understanding is valuable, after all, and to that end I shall set aside the second and third options discussed above as lines of thought only deserving of further consideration if we cannot find another way to show that understanding has value distinct from that of knowledge.

3.4 Which types of understanding are worthy of further epistemic investigation?
From the investigation of these different types of understanding, I would first conclude that it is important to note that there are fairly common cases of misspeaking where what is really meant is knowledge rather than understanding. I would also conclude that a reductive account of understanding-wh to understanding-that does not work, and so ought not to be endorsed. With relation to the value of understanding, in all cases in which (i) it is apparent that environmental luck cannot undermine the agent’s state, and (ii) the state involved is necessarily a cognitive achievement, I would contend that there is value present that is at the very least distinct from that of knowledge (and in fact possibly superior to it). 

In light of this, objectual/holistic understanding, atomistic understanding/understanding-wh, and the theoretically correct usage of understanding-that are all worthy of further epistemic investigation, as they all fulfill conditions (i) and (ii) above. In the interests of simplicity, I shall focus largely on atomistic understanding, and in light of Brogaard’s criticisms I shall now turn to look at whether the distinctive value of understanding might be explained without reference to understanding’s connection with explanatory relationships. 


4. The Value of Understanding
4.1 The value problem in epistemology
Final value is the value that some good (or in this case, epistemic state) has by its very nature as an end in itself, as opposed to its instrumental value (which is the value that something has as a means to some end). Virtue epistemologists, for example, have in the past argued for the intrinsic value of knowledge (contrasting it with instrumental value), but this is a mistake due to a conflation of intrinsic value with final value. In fact, it is generally held that intrinsic value should instead be contrasted with extrinsic value. The former is the value that some good has in virtue of its non-relational properties—for example, being square is a non-relational property—whereas the latter refers to a relational value-conveying property such as being loved (e.g., Korsgaard, 1983). Final value is what is at issue in the value problem for knowledge, and also what I seek to investigate in relation to understanding.

As I noted at the outset, knowledge is usually taken to have distinctive, final value beyond that of mere true belief. Though it’s clear that we do value knowledge, and that epistemological theorising is largely focused on knowledge, what is less clear is how and why it is valuable, and attempts to explain this value have thus far been fairly unsuccessful. It is seemingly unacceptable to offer a solution to the value problem with reference to the instrumental value of knowledge as compared to its parts. This is because the question is whether and how knowledge has superior value to mere true belief, and merely truly believing that p arguably yields the same practical benefits yielded by knowing that p. In light of this, epistemologists ought to (and largely do) focus on the final value of knowledge when they attempt to illustrate and explain its axiological superiority. It is rarely if ever argued that mere true belief has final value, so there is clearly something about knowledge which leads us to think it is especially valuable in some way.

Pritchard (e.g., 2007) draws attention to value problems other than the traditional formulation, namely the secondary value problem and the tertiary value problem. In brief, the secondary value problem asks why knowledge is more valuable than ‘any proper sub-set of its parts’ (i.e., any epistemic standing that is considered a component of knowledge and yet falls short of knowledge—this might be true belief, or any number of other alleged components of knowledge). The tertiary value problem asks for an explanation of what sort of unique value exists or appears at just that point where knowledge is achieved (rather than somewhere before or after knowledge on the continuum). This problem is more or less equivalent to the problem of explaining why knowledge has final (i.e., non-instrumental) value because it asks how knowledge is superior to lesser epistemic standings in kind rather than just degree. If knowledge has distinctive value, this must be a matter of kind, making solving the tertiary value problem essential to the project of proving that knowledge has superior value overall. Though it is plausible that all of these problems must be attended to, it is sensible to afford the primary value problem the highest priority initially. This is because the question of why knowledge might be more valuable than mere true belief is the least demanding of the three—without a convincing solution to that, trying to solve the additional value problems looks impossible.

All talk of epistemic value involves an implicit presupposition that there are fundamental epistemic goods. A fundamental epistemic good (Pritchard, forthcoming b, p. 7) is one which at least in some cases has value which is not just instrumental in relation to some further epistemic good, whilst a non-fundamental epistemic good is one which only ever has value that is instrumental and relative to a further epistemic good. The reasons why possessing final epistemic value and being a fundamental epistemic good are not the same are that (i) it’s possible for an epistemic good to be fundamental without being finally valuable, and (ii) something’s being a fundamental epistemic good merely entails that it sometimes has more than instrumental value, whilst something’s being finally valuable entails that it is valuable in the way that it is by its very nature. As a result, even if knowledge is not always finally valuable, provided it is at some points then it will nonetheless qualify as a fundamental epistemic good.
As argued by Pritchard (forthcoming b) and briefly noted above in my section on cognitive achievement’s plausibility as a hallmark feature of understanding, robust virtue epistemologists provide the most initially promising response to the question of why knowledge is finally valuable. However, they ultimately fail to do so precisely because (i) they incorrectly identify knowledge with cognitive achievement, and (ii) even if they were correct to say that cognitive achievement is involved in all cases of knowledge, it would nonetheless still be the case that cognitive achievement which doesn’t involve knowledge is no less valuable than knowledge in spite of falling short of it. Robust virtue epistemologists might attempt to rescue their thesis from problem (i) by saying that knowing is at least an epistemic state that is coupled with cognitive achievement in the majority of cases, but Pritchard claims this would not be enough to answer the tertiary value problem because it is incorrect to even contend that most knowledge comes hand-in-hand with cognitive achievement. In fact, more often than not, we get testimonial knowledge without being primarily creditable for the true belief we form, and there are also wholly different cases (e.g., involving faith in our own faculties rather than another agent) in which we are once again not primarily creditable. If knowledge is not an achievement, one can’t appeal to the final value of achievements in order to meet the challenge laid out by the tertiary value problem. With reference to (ii), the more fundamental issue, cognitive achievement that does not involve knowledge is an epistemic standing lesser than knowledge and yet possessed of the same level of value—this means robust virtue epistemologists will fail to explain why knowledge is more valuable in both degree and kind than those standings which fall short of knowledge. 
Pritchard identifies knowledge as having the structure dictated by what he calls anti-luck virtue epistemology (see forthcoming b), leading to convincing resolutions to the primary and secondary value problems, but not the tertiary value problem (which is the demand for final value). That the best contemporary theory of knowledge fails to provide a complete explanation of the value of knowledge leaves us with the distinct impression that the tertiary value problem for knowledge may simply be unanswerable. However, can we answer the question of why understanding might be valuable as a matter of both degree and kind?
4.2 Cognitive achievement’s impact on the value of understanding
If understanding does have final value beyond that of knowledge, and if Kvanvig is wrong to think that it is the coherence-making relationships involved in understanding which are responsible for conferring extra value upon it, then a few different factors might plausibly be responsible for this difference. I consider the two main contenders to be understanding’s permanent tie to cognitive achievement, and understanding’s immunity to environmental epistemic luck.

First, we shall take a closer look at cognitive achievement. The intellectual sophistication demanded by understanding, which we noted at the beginning of this discussion, is plausibly tied to understanding’s being a cognitive achievement. Obviously, if all achievements are finally valuable, and understanding is a type of cognitive achievement, then understanding will be finally valuable too (e.g., Pritchard forthcoming b, p. 20). In the absence of any obvious counter-examples, I shall assume here that understanding is a cognitive achievement in all cases—that is to say, that cognitive achievement and understanding never come apart. If we want to argue that understanding has more value than knowledge, then a sensible place to start is to look at whether the fact cognitive achievement is wedded to understanding confers any extra value on it. 

There are two important interrelated questions to answer here, the first being whether cognitive achievement does have final value, and the second being whether achievement is correctly defined as success that is caused by ability. Although we have already seen that robust virtue epistemologists are wrong to identify knowledge with a cognitive achievement (because sometimes knowledge is more, and other times it is less), they are hoping to solve the epistemic value problem with just this line of thought and so assumedly have some justification in place for the allegedly high axiological standing of cognitive achievement. Greco (e.g., 2002), a supporter of the final value of achievement, treats cognitive achievement as but one branch of achievement in general (where achievements are, as stated, successes that are because of ability, and cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability is therefore valuable because all achievements are valuable).

Are there, then, any good reasons to think that achievements are not valuable in themselves, or that the definition of ‘achievement’ that we are working with is wrong? Pritchard (forthcoming a) considers and rejects some obvious concerns as regards this first issue—he mentions that you might want to say that surely some achievements (construed as successes that are because of ability) ought not to be bearers of final value because they are too (i) easy, (ii) trivial, or (iii) deplorable. 

As regards (i) and (ii), the thought is that it seems odd to call something an achievement if the person doing the ‘achieving’ has not in so doing managed to overcome some at least minimally significant obstacle and/or in so doing exhibited some level of skill. However, the account of achievements given above looks as though it will rule in things such as nodding one’s head as an achievement (Pritchard, forthcoming b, e.g., p. 26). Further, there is nothing to prevent us calling passive exercises of agency ‘achievements’ (e.g., reflexively dropping something because it is hot enough to burn skin). The same is obviously true for some achievements which are specifically cognitive, such as my formation of the true belief that you are wearing a purple coat—under normal circumstances, this cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability does not intuitively seem like an achievement because in forming the true belief I am neither exhibiting some significant cognitive skill nor overcoming any significant obstacle. In short, such instances of success because of ability look simply too easy to be comfortably dubbed ‘achievements’ or to be thought of as bearers of final value. This gives us grounds to worry about the over-inclusiveness of their being defined as successes that are because of ability—this account of achievements is seemingly not strict enough if we want to claim that achievements have final value.

The sensible response to this problem is to strengthen the achievements thesis to the extent that the only successes counting as achievements are ones which are (a) because of ability and (b) involve the agent either exercising a significant level of ability or overcoming a significant obstacle (p. 67). Further, part (a) of the achievement thesis is also best construed as saying that achievements are successes that are primarily creditable to the exercise of one's ability, because an agent’s success must surely not be largely determined by some factor external to the agent's relevant abilities. These amendments are part of Pritchard’s so-called ‘strong achievement thesis’, and he also notes (p. 68-70) some other minor benefits to a stronger achievement thesis (in that it is now even more convincing to claim that achievements are the sorts of things which are finally valuable, and it can accommodate both cases of passive achievement and cases involving transparent subject matter). It also describes achievement in such a way that it seems even more obvious that understanding ought to come under this heading—it looks as though understanding is only gained when we make the effort to overcome obstacles in order to comprehend how distinct pieces of information interlock, and whenever one achieves understanding quickly or with minimal effort this appears to be because significant ability is involved.

Cognitive achievements, then, must be primarily creditable to the agent’s own cognitive abilities (as opposed to, for example, an external event or even the significant exercise of another agent’s cognitive abilities). To return to the issue of the value of achievements, it seems sensible to then suppose that the successes involved in such achievements (both cognitive and otherwise) are finally valuable because of their means of production (this means that final value is conferred upon them because they are the result of the exercise of some ability). That (i) one would always tend to opt for a success involving achievement exhibition over the very same success involving no such achievement (with no reduction to the agent’s benefits), and (ii) that it seems intuitively correct to do so suggests that achievements do have final value. Consider a specific example—suppose that I win £100 by throwing a ring over a particular peg at a hoopla fairground stall. In terms of instrumental import, it matters not whether this was luck or the result of the exercise of any specific skill on my part—the prize money is still mine. However, if I won this money by way of accurate and finely-tuned aiming/throwing skills then surely we would ascribe more value to the win than we would in the (sadly more likely) scenario in which I blindly threw the ring in my typically graceless fashion and it just happened to land on top of the relevant peg. This is because the skilled success involved in the former case seems to have some sort value in itself. This is highly suggestive of the final value of achievements in general.

As regards the objection that some achievements are too deplorable to count as bearers of final value, the thought is that, for example, some of Hitler’s actions doubtlessly resulted in achievements, and yet that they are deplorable generally gives one the intuition that they ought not to be considered finally valuable. You can respond to this problem, Pritchard argues, by claiming that all achievements are valuable as achievements, rather than that every achievement has extremely high default value overall, and by asserting that the value of any achievements that fall into this category is undermined by these counteractive properties that they also possess. The value of achievements claim is thus totally consistent with deplorable achievements.

Endorsing a conception of cognitive achievement which construes it as satisfying the requirements of the strong achievement thesis provides us with good grounds for holding that it is finally valuable, and that understanding is therefore also finally valuable given that it is wedded to cognitive achievement and thus has value conferred upon it by this property. Further, a fringe benefit of a solid theory explaining the final value of understanding is that such distinctive, final value makes it the case that understanding is a fundamental epistemic good (and it is therefore impossible to create a version of the swamping problem to attack the value of understanding, because its status as a fundamental epistemic good prevents its epistemic value from being ‘swamped’ by the value of the cognitive success that is an integral part of understanding). 

Robust virtue epistemology, then, provides a good platform for a revisionist theory of epistemic value in that it shows us why knowledge might look like it is valuable. Plausibly, we come to erroneously suppose that knowledge might be able to solve the value problem by making the mistake of identifying knowledge as a sort of cognitive achievement. This is an understandably misleading move given that cognitive achievement itself arguably does have distinctive, final value (as one branch of general achievement, and construed according to a stronger version of the achievement thesis which will be further expounded below). Understanding is broadly similar to knowledge in many ways, it is possessed of the correct properties for final value, and knowledge is more often than not present when understanding is. As a result, incorrectly labeling knowledge as something with final value is an easy mistake to make. Further, we have now successfully responded to Brogaard’s claim that Kvanvig is wrong to say that understanding is distinctively valuable—we have done so by making a solid case for the thesis that understanding has final value without making any appeal to Kvanvig’s claims about coherence making relationships.





4.3 Benign epistemic luck and understanding’s value
There are types of epistemic luck which are benign, and perfectly compatible with knowledge—content, capacity and evidential (or doxastic) luck are among these (Pritchard 2005, p. 133-141). In order to see whether understanding holds up against epistemic luck more effectively than knowledge does, and to ensure that it is not undermined by any forms of luck that we have not already considered here, we must examine the benign sorts of epistemic luck to clarify whether they are benign not only for cases of potential knowledge but also for cases of potential understanding.

Content luck is rooted in Unger’s non-accidental account of knowledge (1968). It is present when it is lucky that the proposition is true. It is benign because the lucky aspect in play when the fact obtains is devoid of epistemic significance. If we take Unger’s paradigm example of an agent who witnesses a car crash, that the proposition is in a sense accidentally true has no influence on the fact that the witnessing agent knows the proposition (provided it is no accident that he is correct to believe the proposition, and he meets all the necessary conditions for knowledge). Nevertheless, knowledge of a car crash is harmlessly infected with content epistemic luck in the sense that it is a non-trivial event which failed to obtain in a large number of the relevant close possible worlds. 

This car crash example, a case clearly featuring content epistemic luck, is as easily applied to understanding as it is applied to knowledge. Although it is in a sense lucky that the car accident occurred, this does nothing to prevent our witnessing agent from understanding why it occurred. 

Capacity luck is also rooted in Unger’s account of knowledge, and is present when it is lucky that the agent is capable of knowledge. It too is benign because it being lucky that the knower exists (and/or that luck is involved in the determination of the abilities that lead her to know) is not epistemically significant. Unger makes the odd remark that an agent’s existence at a particular time is ‘largely accidental,’ (1968, p. 160) but his illustrative example in discussion of what Pritchard later calls capacity epistemic luck (2005, p. 135) is clear enough; it involves a non-trivial event which once again failed to obtain in a large number of the relevant close possible worlds. Our agent is focused on a turtle and is unaware that he has only just managed to avoid being crushed by a rock that would otherwise have fallen down on top of him. In spite of the fact that his still being alive at this point is accidental in the sense that it is highly unlikely, and that his being able to know any proposition at all is thereby also accidental in this sense, he nonetheless knows that there is a turtle on the ground in front of him (because it is no accident that he is correct to believe the proposition, and he meets all the necessary conditions for knowledge). That an agent is lucky to be in a position to know anything does not prevent him from acquiring bona fide knowledge.

In reference to the second strain of capacity epistemic luck (where luck has some influence on the agent’s cognitive abilities), inventing examples to illustrate its failure to prevent knowledge acquisition is a fairly straight forward matter. Pritchard gives the example of the counter-factual danger to the agent coming from a branch caught behind another branch so that the agent would be irreversibly blinded in both eyes were he or someone else to move the branch. In Pritchard’s case, the agent releases the caught branch a moment before he spots the turtle, and happens to duck down to tie his shoelaces just at the instant the branch would have hit and blinded him. This is clearly a lucky escape—in possible worlds where the initial conditions are the same as they are for this agent, there will be very few in which he is not blinded by the branch (an event that is highly significant to him). That this is a lucky event impacts on the fact he is in the correct place to see the turtle, making it a lucky event as well (since in most relevantly similar nearby possible worlds he is not in a position to observe the turtle). Still, once again he is not lucky to be right that there is a turtle before him, and is therefore in possession of knowledge.

We have, then, two sorts of capacity epistemic luck, in which the agent is either (i) lucky to be alive, or (ii) lucky to have the cognitive abilities that permit him to be in this specific epistemic state. First, we have the case where the agent narrowly misses out on being killed just prior to observing a turtle. This does not prevent him from understanding why the turtle crossed his path (because it is headed towards a pool of water) any more than it prevents him from knowing that he is looking at a turtle. Second, we have the case where he was lucky not to be blinded just prior to seeing the turtle, and this is another case in which luck fails to impact on his understanding. 

Pritchard draws out a third form of benign epistemic luck from Unger’s discussion of  content epistemic luck, one not explicitly signposted, and dubs it ‘evidential epistemic luck.’ This arises when it is a matter of luck that an agent comes to acquire the evidence she has in support of her true belief. To take and expand Unger’s example, imagine an employee who accidentally happens to hear her boss reveal that she is going to be fired because she is almost always late for work. She does not intend to overhear such a conversation, to gain any information from her boss, or to in fact by anywhere near the boss’s office. We assumedly wouldn’t hesitate to ascribe knowledge to this employee, in spite of the fact that her coming to acquire the evidence in favour of the true proposition is highly lucky (in that she does not acquire the evidence in most nearby possible worlds). Pritchard’s exposition of this case reveals a possible conflation of evidential luck with a doxastic luck affecting the agent’s belief formation; in cases of doxastic luck, the agent is lucky to come into possession of the relevant evidence, and also lucky to form the true belief that she does. This doxastic luck is also present in our case of the employee who overhears her boss discussing her imminent firing, because in most close possible worlds she doesn’t form the belief that she will soon be fired (as she doesn’t overhear the conversation). 

Doxastic luck, then, is present when it is lucky that the agent believes the proposition. Pritchard queries whether doxastic and evidential luck can exist independently, quickly ruling out the possibility of a case where an agent fails to believe the relevant proposition because she discounts the evidence she acquires—evidential luck would be present in such a case because it would be lucky that this evidence came into her possession, but doxastic luck would be absent because she shuns the true belief that is allied with the lucky evidence. However, part of evidential luck’s definition is that it is lucky that the agent comes to hold evidence in favour of the relevant proposition. Further, without the relevant belief the agent would not be a candidate for knowledge possession, so evidential epistemic luck without the presence of concurrent doxastic luck is a senseless notion which prevents the agent from having knowledge at all. It is therefore of no real relevance to the study of epistemic luck. 

More importantly, doxastic and evidential luck might come apart in the following sense—it might be lucky that an agent believes a proposition, but he might not have any evidence (and therefore doxastic luck will be present unaccompanied by evidential luck). An example might feature our agent forming a perceptual belief after lucky exposure to some sort of stimulus, and in such cases it seems plausible to suppose that she lacks evidence for her belief (at least in the internalist sense of evidence, where something only counts as evidence in favour of a belief if it is readily accessible as such to the agent in question). This possibility is allowed by our prior definitions of these two forms of luck, and if we concede that agents can sometimes acquire knowledge whilst having no evidence in favour of their relevant true beliefs. An endorsement of epistemic externalism is required for the proposal that doxastic luck can be present without evidential luck to make sense, and for this reason Pritchard proposes that we treat them as co-applicable (especially since they are so in almost all cases) in order to avoid complicating this early discussion of benign luck with contentious claims about what sort of justification is required for knowledge possession. For the duration of his discussion of epistemic luck, he uses the term “evidential luck” to apply to cases in which doxastic epistemic luck is also present. 

Does the evidentially lucky agent who accidentally overhears her boss discussing her imminent loss of employment also understand why she is about to be fired? Yes—the fact that she was unlikely to come to possess this evidence does not undermine her ability to understand why she is being fired (once she overhears her boss’s conversation about her repeated lateness).

It appears, then, that the forms of epistemic luck which are benign (and therefore unable to impede knowledge possession) are similarly unable to impede understanding. We turn now to the malignant, more complicated forms of luck: veritic luck, and reflective luck.

4.4 Malignant epistemic luck and understanding’s value
Pritchard’s definition of veritic epistemic luck (2005, p. 146) cites that it is present when it is a matter of luck that one’s belief is true. In Gettier cases, the knowledge-undermining luck that causes the problem is a particular form of veritic luck which concerns the intervention of malignant luck in a way that impairs what Unger calls ‘the relation concerning the man and the fact,’ unlike evidential, content or capacity epistemic luck (which, rather, influence the preconditions for knowledge). Although the agent in a Gettier case has a true belief, luck is present between that agent and the state of affairs which he truly believes obtains. Due to understanding’s factivity, agents in Gettier cases are also prevented from having understanding.

With environmental veritic luck, there is not the same sort of intervention that can be found in Gettier-style cases. In the barn façade case, for example, the agent travelling through the Fake Barn area does form his true belief as a direct result of actually seeing a real barn, but his environment is not an epistemically friendly one and thus prevents him from possessing knowledge because his true belief is therefore a matter of environmental epistemic luck. As we have seen, this prevents knowledge whilst leaving understanding untouched.

Pritchard’s definition of reflective luck (p. 175) cites that it is present when, given what the agent is able to know by reflection alone, it is a matter of luck that her belief is true. Reflective luck is at the heart of the sceptical challenge, and antisceptical proposals which manage to eliminate any luck at all seem to only manage to eliminate Gettier-style veritic luck. Regardless of the theory of knowledge adopted, this particular form of luck is problematic as one can never know by reflection alone that a sceptical scenario is not an actuality. Given epistemology’s failure to beat the sceptical challenge, all one can do in the face of the wide-ranging impact of the problem is to opt for the pragmatic response of proceeding as though sceptical scenarios do not obtain. We are in a position to possibly have brute, externalist knowledge (i.e., knowledge without reflective accessibility to the facts in virtue of which we are justified) if we proceed by using the same evidence-collecting methods we have hitherto employed. Adhering to a policy of philosophical scepticism, however, would lead to our giving up on having the faintest possibility of any form of knowledge (in light of our abstinence from belief, assuming doxastic voluntarism is even possible). Pritchard thinks the pervasiveness of reflective luck gives us reason to pursue an internalist epistemology. As we have seen, understanding is a primarily internalist notion, but it light of its necessary factivity it unfortunately appears to be undermined by reflective luck in much the same way as knowledge. 

Understanding, then, though also undermined by reflective luck, is untroubled by benign epistemic luck and less susceptible to veritic luck than knowledge. This leaves it in a generally better position than knowledge to deal with epistemic luck, and this is precisely because its distinctively valuable status as a cognitive achievement protects it from one important form of luck—environmental veritic luck.

Conclusion
From this investigation of understanding, we have been able to clarify some contested notions in the current literature. Firstly, we have dismissed the claim that understanding is a species of knowledge, leaving the way clear to investigate understanding as a plausibly valuable epistemic state in its own right. Secondly, the upshot of exploring a variety of possibly distinctive features of understanding as compared to knowledge has revealed only two which are genuinely distinctive, with a number of features belonging to both knowledge and understanding. Non-factivity and transparency are the two notable exceptions which have turned out not to be features of understanding at all. We have further discovered that whilst a degree of luck-immunity can be ascribed to understanding, the claim that understanding is immune to epistemic luck simpliciter is too strong. Rather, what sets it apart from knowledge in the sphere of epistemic luck is its immunity to environmental luck. 

In examining a number of types of understanding discussed and variously named by a central group of epistemologists, we have discovered three types of understanding significantly different from knowledge: (i) holistic or objectual understanding (of a subject matter), (ii) understanding that something is the case (in the context of, and in connection with, other aspects of a chunk of information), and (iii) atomistic understanding or understanding-wh.

Further to this, we have investigated the nature of understanding’s value and discovered that two distinctive features of understanding are plausibly responsible for its final value: its inextricable link to cognitive achievement and its immunity to environmental epistemic luck (the latter of which is directly connected to understanding’s status as a member of the broader class of cognitive achievements). In making sure that it is unaffected by luck which is similarly benign for knowledge, we have ensured that it is indeed correct to claim that, as things stand, understanding is less plagued by problems of epistemic luck than knowledge. 































¹ The regress problem for epistemic justification is that the three obvious candidates for an explanation of how our beliefs get their justification are all unsatisfying. We can either say that there is no support for our beliefs, that their support comes from an infinite chain of further beliefs, or that their support comes from a circle of related beliefs. For an introduction to this issue, see Pritchard (2006, p. 36-41).

² Kvanvig notes that if we branch out from studying knowledge and justification, abandoned or problem-plagued theories may be illuminatingly employed elsewhere.

 On a related note, it is interesting that it appears that understanding’s instrumental value might have more significance than the instrumental value of knowing. This may be because the implication of understanding’s instrumental value for its final value is undisrupted (unlike in the case of knowledge), rather than because the instrumental value of understanding is greater. In light of this, perhaps its instrumental value can do some work in explaining its final value, unlike the instrumental value of knowledge.

 The reason I say and/or here is due to Pritchard’s point (forthcoming b, p. 65) that some achievements (e.g., a disabled person’s moving some limb) are achievements lacking in skill exhibition yet featuring an agent clearly defeating an obstacle, whilst other achievements (e.g., an expert artist’s perfectly painting a landscape) lack substantial obstacles but involve a great degree of skill exhibition.

 In brief, the swamping problem is leveled at any account of the value of knowledge which claims that knowledge is more valuable than true belief because of instrumental value (though it is generally treated with reference to reliabilism, the theory of knowledge which demands that true belief be produced by a reliable process). The idea is that the value of the end product (true belief) swamps the value of the additional component of knowledge which led to the formation of this belief, to the extent that it is then impossible to account for the allegedly superior value of knowledge over true belief. Note that the tendency for knowledge to sometimes occur alongside cognitive achievement can help to solve the swamping problem if cognitive achievements are the sorts of things which are finally valuable.
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